Distributed Cognition is the concept that cognition is socially distributed among a group of people, the resources and materials (technological artifacts) in the work environment (a small sociotechnical system). Basically, a cognitive process is not necessarily limited to the brain as traditional cognitive science assumes. Hutchins (1995) argues that cognitive science raised these boundaries primarily for analytic convenience but these boundaries are not realistic as human cognition exists in its natural habitat. Therefore, DC assumes that a cognitive process involves the interactions among many brains and technological artifacts (Hollan et al., 2000). Artifacts are the materials and resources in the system that can be used in a purposeful and conscious way by humans.
The argument [for DC theory] is as follows. Cognitive processes involve trajectories of information (transmission and transformation), so the patterns of these information trajectories, if stable, reflect some underlying cognitive architecture. Since social organization - plus the structure added by the context of activity - largely determines the way information flows through a group, social organization may itself may be viewed as a form of cognitive architecture (Hollan et al., 2000, p. 177).
Hollans’s argument helps us to examine cognitive activities of people in their mutual working environments than the working of the individual mind. "Distributed cognition is not some "new" kind of cognition, rather a recognition of the perspective that all of cognition can be fruitfully viewed as occurring in a distributed manner" (Halverson, 2002, p. 248).
DC does not only refer to distributed information. It also refers to the architecture through which information is transmitted and represented. Additionally, DC does not claim that artifacts are cognizing entities. The theory simply models both humans and their artifacts as representational systems. Therefore, DC is concerned with representations of inside and outside the human head and the transformation these structures undergo (Nardi, 1996). The focus is on the representations both internal to the individual and those created and displayed by artifacts. With this viewpoint, DC can help answer of the question, "What information is required to carry out some task and where should it be located, as an interface object [hardware or software] or as something that is mentally represented by the user?" (Wright, Fields, and Harrison, 2000, p. 12).
The main goal in DC is to account for how the distributed structures that comprise the sociotechnical system and are coordinated. This is skilled by analysing various contributions of the environment in which the work activity takes place. These contributions come from the representational media (e.g., instruments, displays, manuals, navigation charts, etc), the interactions of individuals with each other, and their interactions with artifacts in the environment (Rogers and Ellis, 1994).
The argument [for DC theory] is as follows. Cognitive processes involve trajectories of information (transmission and transformation), so the patterns of these information trajectories, if stable, reflect some underlying cognitive architecture. Since social organization - plus the structure added by the context of activity - largely determines the way information flows through a group, social organization may itself may be viewed as a form of cognitive architecture (Hollan et al., 2000, p. 177).
Hollans’s argument helps us to examine cognitive activities of people in their mutual working environments than the working of the individual mind. "Distributed cognition is not some "new" kind of cognition, rather a recognition of the perspective that all of cognition can be fruitfully viewed as occurring in a distributed manner" (Halverson, 2002, p. 248).
DC does not only refer to distributed information. It also refers to the architecture through which information is transmitted and represented. Additionally, DC does not claim that artifacts are cognizing entities. The theory simply models both humans and their artifacts as representational systems. Therefore, DC is concerned with representations of inside and outside the human head and the transformation these structures undergo (Nardi, 1996). The focus is on the representations both internal to the individual and those created and displayed by artifacts. With this viewpoint, DC can help answer of the question, "What information is required to carry out some task and where should it be located, as an interface object [hardware or software] or as something that is mentally represented by the user?" (Wright, Fields, and Harrison, 2000, p. 12).
The main goal in DC is to account for how the distributed structures that comprise the sociotechnical system and are coordinated. This is skilled by analysing various contributions of the environment in which the work activity takes place. These contributions come from the representational media (e.g., instruments, displays, manuals, navigation charts, etc), the interactions of individuals with each other, and their interactions with artifacts in the environment (Rogers and Ellis, 1994).
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